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Abstract 
It is well known by now that population ageing threatens the sustainability of fiscal policies in 
many countries. Although a number of policy options are available to address the problem, the 
uncertainty surrounding the future development of the population complicates matters.  
This paper analyses the economic, intergenerational and welfare effects of several alternative 
taxation policies that can be used to close the fiscal sustainability gap: immediate tax 
smoothing, delayed tax smoothing and balanced budget policies. A distinction is made between 
a consumption tax and a labour income tax. In addition, the influence of demographic 
uncertainty on the results of these policies is analysed from a number of perspectives. Simulated 
population shocks show the effect of demographic volatility on macroeconomic and fiscal 
variables. Stochastic simulations are presented to produce probabilistic bounds for the future 
development of the economic outcomes and to analyse the issue of optimal fiscal policy under 
uncertainty.  
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1. Introduction 
A number of studies have pointed out that ageing populations render current fiscal policies 
unsustainable in many industrialised countries. With unchanged policies, the sizeable changes in 
the ratio of retirees to workers that is expected in the future will eventually make public deficit 
and debt ratios explode. Policy adjustments can take a variety of forms: examples are increasing 
one or more tax rates, cutting one or more types of public expenditure or implementing reforms 
that increase the rate of labour market participation. In addition, given the choice of a particular 
policy instrument, different timing options are available. In particular, one may decide to act 
immediately or to change policies at some specified date in the future. There are infinite 
combinations of these options.  
A complicating factor for policy-makers is that the future development of the population is 
uncertain. At the household level, mortality risk affects the consumption and labour supply 
decisions of individuals, which in turn have policy implications. More directly, demographic 
uncertainty gives rise to the possibility of a government role in intergenerational risk-sharing. In 
considering the fiscal adjustments required to restore sustainability, policy-makers must 
evaluate not just the efficiency and welfare consequences of various policy instruments but also 
the influence of demographic uncertainty on the results of the policies.  
The first part of this paper considers the situation in which future demographic developments 
are known with certainty to policy-makers. Three policy options to restore fiscal solvency are 
explored along with their economic, intergenerational and welfare effects: immediate tax 
smoothing, delayed tax smoothing and balanced budget policies. This approach allows us to 
assess how much the three differ in terms of economic efficiency and how they compare in 
terms of redistribution between generations. It also helps us to explain why not a single country 
has adopted immediate tax-smoothing policies that would restore the sustainability of fiscal 
solvency: policies for delayed tax smoothing and a balanced budget are much more favourable 
to current generations than those aimed at immediate tax smoothing, whereas the efficiency 
losses from these two sets of policies are relatively small.  
The second part of the paper addresses the impact of demographic uncertainty on public debt 
policies from a number of perspectives. First the interaction between demographic and 
economic variables is demonstrated by showing the effect of a variety of demographic shocks 
on a sustainable tax smoothing policy. Then stochastic population forecasts for the Netherlands 
are used to produce probabilistic bounds for the development of Dutch public finances. In this 
way, a distribution of possible economic outcomes is presented spanning the period up to 2050. 
Finally, the influence of demographic uncertainty on optimal policy is explored by extending 
our model to allow for the possibility of precautionary public saving when the government acts 
as a welfare-maximising agent. 
There is some earlier literature on the efficiency implications of different types of public debt 
policies. Cutler et al. (1990) compared the efficiency losses of immediate tax smoothing and 
balanced budget policies and found them to differ only slightly in the US. Van Ewijk et al. 
(2000) performed a similar exercise with similar outcomes for the Netherlands. Flodén’s (2002) 
study for European countries found substantial welfare differences, however. He gives two 2 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
reasons for the difference in results. First, the population in European countries is expected to 
age more dramatically than that of the US. Second, the average European economy features a 
much larger public sector and higher tax rates. According to welfare economics, welfare is 
convex in tax rates, which means one would expect deviations from optimal debt policies to 
have more serious welfare consequences in the case of Europe. The analysis of tax distortions in 
Sweden and the US by Jonsson & Klein (2003) underscores the role of the size of the public 
sector. 
Our analysis differs from these earlier papers in at least two aspects. First, it compares different 
policies also in terms of intergenerational redistribution. Second, it distinguishes different types 
of tax smoothing. In a world with more than one type of taxation, different instruments are 
available in which the efficiency (and redistribution) effects may be quite different.  
The paper adopts a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Dutch economy. The 
model contains overlapping generations of households. Thus it allows us to calculate the effects 
that different types of policies and demographic uncertainty have on the redistribution between 
generations. In particular, the redistribution between current and future generations is 
interesting, if the interests of current generations determine policy choices. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the dynamic CGE model that 
we used for our calculations, named GAMMA. Section 3 describes the future development of 
the economy under the condition of unchanged fiscal policies. This motivates the quest for 
policy reforms that restore fiscal sustainability. Section 4 analyses two forms of immediate tax 
smoothing: the first uses a labour income tax as an instrument, the second a consumption tax. 
Sections 5 and 6 analyse forms of delayed tax smoothing and balanced budget policies. Section 
7 shows how demographic shocks impact public policy and considers variables in the model. 
Section 8 presents the results of stochastic simulations that produce distributions of the effects 
of policies, providing a richer analysis than that using a deterministic demographic scenario. 
Finally, section 9 analyses the effects of demographic uncertainty on optimal government 
policy. Section 10 concludes. 
2.  Efficiency and equity evaluation using the GAMMA model 
This study uses the dynamic general equilibrium model GAMMA, which gives a stylised 
picture of the long-term economic development using an overlapping generational framework. 
The model’s strength is its thorough descriptions of both the government sector using 
generational accounting and the pension sector. The model incorporates life-cycle behaviour of 
households and endogenous labour supply. As these decisions depend on expectations over a 
long period the model assumes forward-looking behaviour on the part of individuals. In this 
aspect the model deviates from more traditional CPB models that have a shorter time horizon. 
The approach used here is necessary for a consistent analysis of the consequences of budgetary 
policies over a long time horizon. The focus on long-term consistency comes at the price of 
some abstractions in other aspects. For example, full forward-looking behaviour is obviously 
too strong an assumption. Also firm behaviour is modelled in a very rudimentary fashion. So the 
model’s results have to be understood as a benchmark for the research questions at hand and not 
in all respects as the most realistic description of the world. To understand the results some 
knowledge of GAMMA model seems necessary. 
The GAMMA model attaches the following features to the Dutch economy. First, it considers 
the Dutch economy to be small relative to the outside world. In particular, domestic policies do 
not affect the interest rate, which is determined on world capital markets. Second, the goods 
produced at home are perfectly substitutable with those produced abroad. Third, the model is 
deterministic. Lifetime uncertainty is recognised, but perfect capital markets enable households DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 3 
 
to insure against this type of risk. The GAMMA model features perfect foresight: expectations 
coincide with realisations. Furthermore, agents are rational (i.e.  they maximise their utility 
functions given the constraints they face) and have free access to perfect and complete capital 
markets. 
The GAMMA model is used throughout this study. The baseline projection of section 3 is 
produced by GAMMA, but in a special way: labour participation and the consumption profile 
over the life cycle are determined outside the model and are used to calibrate the model. Using 
GAMMA for the baseline also ensures that the income, consumption and wealth of households 
are consistent. The behavioural underpinnings in GAMMA are especially relevant to the policy 
analyses presented in sections 4, 5 and 6 and the sensitivity analyses of sections 7, 8 and 9. 
The GAMMA model distinguishes three important channels through which the government 
budget influences household behaviour: taxes on labour, the consumption tax and the capital tax 
on household savings. As labour supply depends on net wages, labour income taxation and 
consumption taxation reduce labour supply. Pensions in their current form increase labour 
supply. This effect, which is not frequently recognised, results from the implicit government 
subsidies in pensions: pensions are taxed at a lower rate than labour income and pension savings 
are exempted from the capital tax. As participation in pension funds is obligatory, this pension 
subsidy acts as a subsidy of labour supply. In addition, the capital tax affects savings. The real 
rate of return declines if this tax rate increases, which makes saving less attractive. Labour 
income tax and consumption tax also have an influence on savings. To understand this 
mechanism we have to go into the life-cycle model, which provides the basic theoretical 
framework for modelling household behaviour.  
2.1 Household  savings 
According to the life-cycle theory, households rationally choose levels of current and future 
consumption and labour supply (leisure). Every household is represented by a finitely-lived 
adult. Longevity risk is assumed to be diversified; each household receives an annuity from a 
life insurance company in return for bequeathing it its remaining assets upon death (Yaari, 
1965).  
Labour supply and its complement, leisure, only depend on the marginal reward of labour; the 
wealth effect is assumed to be zero.
1 According to this life-cycle model households smooth the 
utility of consumption and leisure over their life cycle, which implies that in principle every 
year they consume goods and leisure in fixed proportions. This in turn suggests a positive 
correlation between consumption and labour supply. The time profile of consumption depends 
on the difference between the interest rate and the rate of time preference. Total (broad) 
expenditure is constrained by total wealth, which equals the sum of their financial wealth and 
the discounted value of their potential
2 future labour and pension income.  
The GAMMA model accounts for the fact that over the life cycle, consumption profiles are 
hump-shaped. This can be explained by, among other factors, household composition. For 
instance, households with children consume more. Taking account of these kinds of age effects, 
the life-cycle model appears consistent with the data (Ree & Alessie, 2006).  
2.2 Firm  behaviour 
Firms are assumed to operate in competitive markets where prices are given by world market 
prices. The cost of capital is given. As a corollary, the incidence of taxes is fully shifted to 
                                                                          
1 Lumsdaine & Mitchell (1999) conclude in their survey article that the wealth effect on labour supply is 
small relative to the price effect. 
2 Potential labour income is defined as income with a labour time equal to the total available time. 4 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
labour. In a small open economy the wage rate has to accommodate changes in both the cost of 
capital and the tax rate. The model assumes that wage accommodation takes place without any 
delay. Production takes place with labour and capital according to a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production technology. Capital deteriorates at a constant rate. The 
productivity of labour is assumed to depend on age. In particular, different age cohorts have 
different productivity levels. Apart from their productivity, the labour supplied by households of 
different ages is homogeneous. Labour productivity grows at a given rate in time (see Table 1). 
Capital adjusts without any delay. 
Table 1. Parameters in the GAMMA model 
Rate of labour-augmenting technological progress (%)  1.7
Substitution elasticity of labour and capital  0.5
Rate of time preference (%)  1.3
Intertemporal substitution elasticity  0.5
Rate of inflation (%)  2
Nominal rate of return on bonds (%)  3.5
Risk premium on shares (%)  3
Real discount factor  3
Substitution elasticity leisure and consumption  0.3
Source: Authors. 
 
The fast adjustment of wages and capital is not realistic from a short-term point of view. The 
simple firm model is acceptable; however, for long-term analyses of this study, which focus on 
the consequences of budgetary policies over a long time horizon. 
2.3 Pension  funds 
The private pension sector (second pillar pensions) has a large influence on the government 
budget, if only through its size. We have already discussed the fact that pension premiums can 
be deducted from income before taxes are determined, while pension benefits are taxed. The 
difference between the tax rate on labour income and pensions implies a subsidy, which 
stimulates labour market participation. The large direct influence of the pension system is thus 
twofold: it implies a delay of the tax receipts and it gives a subsidy on pension savings. The 
total pension premium rate consists of two components, the contribution rate and the catching-
up premium rate. The actuarial fair contribution rate finances the accrual of pension rights while 
the catching-up premium finances (possible) wealth deficits of a pension fund.  
We assume that old-age benefits, including government pensions, are a certain percentage of 
average wages earned over the working period. Furthermore, old-age benefits are indexed to 
prices and partly to wages, reflecting the situation for the average Dutch pension fund. 
2.4  The public sector 
This study emphasises the effects of policies for the intergenerational distribution of welfare. 
For this purpose we use the traditional framework of Generational Accounting (GA) for 
modelling the government budget. 
Generational accounts calculate the net benefit that generations would receive from the 
government if current fiscal rules were continued. Therefore one extrapolates the age profile of 
net benefits, i.e. public expenditures (imputed to age groups) minus taxes, into the future. Figure DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 5 
 
1 shows the age profile of the net benefit to the government budget for our base year 2006. 
Overall, the young and the elderly benefit from public finances, while the middle-aged are net 
contributors. In the original form of GA, as developed by Auerbach, Gokhale & Koflikoff 
(1991), this age profile is assumed to remain constant over time, apart from an indexation to 
productivity. The method of GA has been extended for the Netherlands (Ter Rele, 1998), 
Bovenberg & Ter Rele, 2000) by taking account of projected changes in these age profiles that 
result from a number of trends that are expected to have an impact on tax revenues and 
expenditure. 
Figure 1. Age profile of net benefits from the government (2006) 
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The age profiles are combined with projections for the aggregates of each spending and tax 
component to determine the fiscal benefits and burdens for each age category. 
The GA approach in this study assumes that all government expenditures are assigned to 
generations, even though a significant portion of expenditures are general and not age related. 
Those expenditures that are not age related (e.g. military expenditures or infrastructure) are 
distributed evenly over all individuals.  
2.5 Concluding  remarks 
The dynamic, overlapping generation model GAMMA extends the generational accounting 
model GA by ensuring consistent underpinnings and by including important economic 
behavioural effects. These extensions make the model more convenient for fiscal policy and 
sensitivity analysis, because GAMMA takes into account feedback mechanisms. Moreover, the 
GAMMA model is more convenient for the analysis of intergenerational distribution effects. 
The GAMMA model gives separate distribution effects for the government and pension sectors 
in the form of net benefits and makes compensating variations available as an overall 
distribution indicator. Both the sensitivity and policy analyses with GAMMA become more 
realistic through modelling household and firm behaviour.  6 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
3.  Government finances are unsustainable because of population 
ageing 
How will public finances develop if social security grows in step with welfare and there are no 
corrective budgetary measures? A baseline projection has been calculated on that premise for 
the period 2006-2100 to answer this question.
3  
3.1  Assumptions for the baseline projection 
Drafting a projection of the future development of public finances requires assumptions to be 
made about movements in various exogenous variables. These variables include the discount 
rate the government has to use to determine the present value of future primary budget surpluses 
and labour-augmenting technical progress. In the baseline projection the discount rate is equal to 
3%.  
Labour-augmenting technical progress in the baseline projection amounts to 1.7% per year. The 
actual increase of labour productivity in the market sector could differ slightly from this owing 
to changes in the age profile of the workforce. The underlying assumption is that employees’ 
productivity increases during their years of service until they reach the age of 53. Any changes 
in the capital intensity of the production process can lead to temporary differences between 
movements in productivity in the market sector and labour-augmenting technical progress. 
Moreover, growth in labour productivity is affected by other factors as well. For example, the 
partial elimination of natural gas revenues will in the coming decades slightly depress growth in 
labour productivity at the macro level. 
3.2  Development of public finances without budgetary measures 
Table 2 shows the development of public finances in the baseline projection. The deficit of the 
economic and monetary union (EMU) is projected to reach 1.9% of GDP in 2006. In subsequent 
years, the budget deficit will initially decrease without budgetary measures. This decrease is in 
part owing to the fact that the EMU deficit in 2006 is distorted by cyclical factors. The cyclical 
element in the budget deficit in 2006 is estimated at 1.4% of GDP. This element gradually 
dwindles to zero in the baseline projection after 2006, as the economy recovers to a situation in 
2010 that is neutral in cyclical terms. The EMU deficit also improves in the coming years in the 
baseline projection because interest payments – as a percentage of GDP – decline at the 
assumed nominal interest rate of 3.5%. The government will realise a reduction in interest 
payments upon refinancing the repaid government debt. 
The improvement of the EMU deficit puts an end, in the baseline projection, to the increase in 
the government debt ratio seen in the past few years. The initial accelerated growth of nominal 
GDP also contributes to this, as the denominator of the government debt ratio increases more 
swiftly as a result. These favourable developments in terms of government debt and the debt 
ratio will not last very long in the absence of budgetary measures. Because of the influence of 
population ageing, the primary EMU balance slowly but surely deteriorates in the baseline 
projection after 2010. The reason is that the increase in public pensions (AOW) and health care 
expenditure in the next few decades will outstrip GDP growth; moreover, natural gas revenues 
will gradually decline. While revenues from tax and social security premiums also increase 
more strongly than GDP as a result of population ageing, this favourable development is not 
                                                                          
3 The baseline projection presented here deviates from the projection in Van Ewijk et al. (2006), for two 
reasons. First, the latter study uses the population forecast of the Statistics Netherlands, which deviates 
from the population forecast used here. Second, the initial situation is different because it is not 
calibrated. This leads to deviations in the outcomes for the base year.  DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 7 
 
sufficient to offset the comparatively strong increase of demographically-sensitive public 
expenditure and the gradual decline in natural gas revenues. 
Table 2. Public finances without budgetary measures in the baseline projection 
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
Expenditures    
Social security  12 13.3 15.8 15.7  15.9 
 − public pensions  4.7 6.4 9.1 9 9.2 
 − disability benefits  2 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 
 − unemployment benefits  1 . 2111  1  
 − other benefits  4.1 4 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Health care  8.8 10.1 13.3 14  14 
Education 5 5 5.3 5.3  5.4 
Other expenditure excluding interest payments  19.2 18.5 18.2 18.2  18.2 
Interest payments  2.5 2.3 5.1 11.3  28.9 
Total 47.9 49.7 58.3 65  82.9 
    
Revenues    
Income tax and social security contribution  21.8 23.6 25.2 25.2  25.6 
 − of which on pension income  1.8 2.4 3.7 3.8 4 
Indirect and other taxation  14.7 15.8 17.2 17.1  17.1 
 − of which on consumer expenditure by 
    population aged 65 and older  1.9 2.8 4.3 4.2 4.2 
Corporate income tax  2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3  2.3 
Natural gas revenues  1.6 0.8 0.1 0  0 
Other income  5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3  5.3 
Total 46 48 50.1 49.9  50.2 
    
EMU balance  -1.9 -1.7 -8.2 -15.1  -32.7 
Primary EMU balance  0.6 0.6 -3 -3.8  -3.7 
EMU debt 
a 54.7 49.1 110.7 239  605 
Government net wealth 
a 60.2 51.7 -20.1 -150.7  -517.6 
a Value at the end of the year 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
 
3.3  Economic development in the baseline projection 
Table 3 shows the development of a number of macroeconomic variables in the period 2006-
2100. Notably, the share of national consumption in GDP increases strongly in this period. This 
share peaks around 2040 after which it decreases somewhat. The increase in the share of 
national consumption is produced by comparatively strong growth of three consumption 
categories. The first among these is private consumption. The rapid increase in pensions that 
accompanies population ageing results in an increase in the share of private consumption in 
GDP. That share peaks around 2040, when the private consumption rate will have risen by 8.1 8 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
percentage points compared with 2006. Second, the share of government consumption in GDP 
likewise increases in the projection. The increase occurs largely after 2020 as a result of the 
comparatively strong growth in demand for care. In 2040 the share of government consumption 
in GDP, especially as a result of rising expenditure on health care, is higher by 4.3 percentage 
points in the baseline projection than in 2006.
4 Third, corporate investment also outpaces GDP 
in the projection in the period 2006-40.  
Table 3. Economic development without budgetary measures in the baseline projection 
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
% GDP  
GDP components   
Wage income  50.2 52.9 52.6 52.8 52.8 
Net other income  23.3 19.1 18.3 18.2 18.2 
Depreciation 14.8 15.3 15.2 15.1 15.1 
Indirect taxes less subsidies  11.5 12.5 13.8 13.7 13.7 
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 
   
Components of national consumption   
Private consumption  46.2 50 54.3 54 54 
Government consumption  26.3 27.2 30.6 31.2 31.3 
Corporate investment  17.8 18 20.3 19.7 19.9 
Government investment  2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
National consumption  92.9 97.8 107.7 107.5 107.7 
   
Balance of trade surplus  7.1 2.2 -7.7 -7.5 -7.7 
Balance of primary revenues from  
  abroad  0.4 5.9 4 -2.2 -19.7 
Balance of secondary revenues from  
  abroad  -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 
Balance of current foreign transactions  5.9 6.6 -5.2 -11.2 -28.9 
Net foreign assets 
a, b  0.0 43.6 14.7 -115 -477 
GNP 
c  100.4 105.9 104 97.8 80.3 
a  Increase compared with 2006 
b Value at the end of the year 
c GDP plus balance of primary revenues from abroad 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
The increase in corporate investments occurs mainly in the years 2020-40. That is because the 
growth rate of the labour supply available to businesses gradually becomes less negative after 
2020, enabling businesses to realise a higher growth of production, which in turn requires 
increased rates of investment. 
Overall, national consumption increases much more strongly than GDP. As a result the surplus 
on the balance of trade deteriorates. Nonetheless, the Netherlands will realise a very 
considerable surplus in international trade in the coming decade. On the basis of this 
unsustainable policy, the trade balance surplus is expected to be 7.1% of GDP in 2006.  
                                                                          
4 The share of employment in care in total employment will rise sharply in the coming decades. 
According to the CBP study by Huizinga & Smid (2004), that share is estimated to rise from almost 11% 
in 2001 to some 18% in 2040. DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 9 
 
The international trade balance surplus gradually decreases in the projection and shifts into a 
deficit as from around 2025. This eventually results in an international trade balance deficit of 
7.7% of GDP in 2040. 
The question arises as to whether these trade deficits can be financed without problems. The 
answer to that question is that it will be very difficult without additional budgetary measures. 
The Netherlands will realise insufficient current account surpluses, leading to a very fast decline 
of the foreign assets position. The accompanying deterioration of the balance of primary 
revenues from abroad makes financing the trade deficit unlikely. The next section analyses 
possible budgetary policies to meet this deficit. 
4.  Which one-time tax increase restores sustainability? 
This section presents two tax smoothing simulations: one that uses the consumption tax and one 
that uses the tax on labour income to make government finances sustainable. A comparison of 
the results shows that the two instruments differ in terms of economic efficiency and 
intergenerational distribution. A consumption tax is a more efficient instrument than a labour 
income tax, as it taxes not only workers, but also retirees and individuals of working age who 
live on social security. In both instances, however, current generations lose because of the 
increase in taxes required to restore fiscal sustainability. 
The choice of a tax base has important implications for savings and output, the distribution of 
welfare across generations as well as the level of economic efficiency in the economy. It is 
outside the scope of this paper to elaborate on all these aspects. Here we only present the 
macroeconomic effects. 
The immediate tax change needed to obtain fiscal sustainability results in tax rate increases of 
7.7 and 11.8 percentage points respectively, for the consumption tax and the labour income tax. 
The reason the consumption tax can be lower is because it has a wider base – a consequence of 
two factors. First, the labour income tax excludes persons who live on social security. Second, 
only the consumption tax affects the consumption possibilities of retirees. Thus a consumption 
tax is a levy on existing financial wealth. Since the deadweight loss from taxation increases with 
tax rates, consumption tax smoothing is more efficient than that for labour income tax 
smoothing. 
Overall, the two taxes have similar macroeconomic effects. Yet the change in GDP is negative 
in the labour income tax scenario and positive in the consumption tax scenario because here we 
measure GDP in market prices that include indirect taxes. In both cases there is a decline in the 
share of national consumption in GDP and in the absolute level of its main component, private 
consumption. In the short run, the private consumption decline is larger in the consumption tax 
scenario. In the long run, however, the decline is greater in the labour income tax scenario. 
These findings can be explained as follows. In the consumption tax scenario, labour supply is 
permanently higher, allowing for a higher level of consumption compared with the labour 
income tax scenario. All generations are affected by the consumption tax increase for the rest of 
their lives as shown by the decreases in private consumption in the range of 14.7 to 11.4%. In 
the labour income tax scenario however, the tax increase leaves presently retired generations 
unaffected. This explains the smaller decline of private consumption in the short and medium 
term. When the generations of people who are retired at the time the tax increase sets in 
gradually leave the economy, the consumption effect increases over time. Ultimately, the 
consumption decline is larger in the labour income tax scenario, not only because of lower 
labour supply, but also because of smaller savings in the short and medium run. 
A change of the income or consumption tax rates have per point nearly the same influence on 
labour supply (same semi-elasticity): work becomes less attractive, because the spending 10 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
possibilities decline. The larger income tax increase together with the same semi-elasticity 
brings about a proportionately larger fall in labour supply (see Table 4). The labour costs of 
firms will not change, because taxes cannot be shifted on to capital in a small open economy.  
Table 4. Macroeconomic development in the cases of consumption or labour income tax  
 smoothing 
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
Consumption tax increase    
National consumption (% GDP)  (D) -10.0 -3.6 -3.6 -3.3  -3.3 
Balance of trade surplus (% GDP)  (D) 10.2 4.0 4.0 3.8  3.7 
Balance of current foreign transactions (% 
GDP)  (D) 10.1 6.8 12.0 18.1 35.7 
Net foreign assets 
a (% GDP)  (D) 10.6 71.5 182.5 314.2  681.6 
Gross national product 
b (% GDP)  (D) 0.1 -2.8 -7.9 -14.2  -31.9 
Labour supply (labour years)  (%) -1.6 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4  -1.4 
Production (GDP)  (%) 0.8 1.7 2.3 2.2  2.3 
Private consumption  (%) -14.7 -13.3 -11.8 -11.5  -11.4 
Consumption tax rate  (D) 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7  7.7 
    
Labour income tax increase    
National consumption (% GDP)  (D) -10.4 -3.8 -4.1 -4.2  -4.2 
Balance of trade surplus (% GDP)  (D) 10.1 3.6 3.9 4.0  4.0 
Balance of current foreign transactions (% 
GDP)  (D) 9.7 6.3 11.8 18.1 35.8 
Net foreign assets
 a (% GDP)  (D) 7.8 57.3 160.0 289.2  656.5 
Gross national product
 b (% GDP)  (D) 0.4 -2.7 -7.9 -14.2  -31.9 
Labour supply (labour years)  (%) -2.2 -1.9 -1.8 -1.9  -1.9 
Production (GDP)  (%) -3.3 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4  -3.4 
Private consumption  (%) -11.1 -12.1 -12.6 -13.1  -13.1 
Labour income tax rate  (D) 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.8  11.8 
a Value at the end of the year 
b GDP plus balance of primary revenues from abroad 
Note: D refers to an absolute difference from the baseline projection, while % points to a relative difference from the 
baseline projection.    
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
 
Table 5 presents information on the development of the government budget under the two tax 
smoothing scenarios. Primary public expenditure is partly linked to net production and partly 
linked to wages. Since there is very little change in the wage rate, non-interest expenditures 
under both scenarios decrease in absolute terms owing to the decrease in net production. 
Nevertheless, since GDP measured in market prices rises under the consumption tax, public 
expenditure relative to GDP falls. Under the labour income tax scenario, GDP initially declines 
faster than net production and so the change in primary public expenditure relative to GDP is 
positive. This explains the different signs of non-interest expenditures in the two simulations.  DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 11 
 
Table 5. Development of public sector variables in the cases of consumption or labour income 
tax smoothing 
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
Consumption tax increase  % GDP    
EMU balance  1.3 5.4 11.0 17.3  35.0 
Primary EMU balance  1.3 3.2 4.0 4.1  4.1 
EMU debt 
a   -2.1 -48.0 -148.6 -277.7  -645.3 
Government net wealth 
a   0.7 45.4 145.5 274.5  642.1 
Expenditures -0.6 -3.2 -8.4 -14.6  -32.3 
 – interest payments  0.0 -2.1 -6.9 -13.2  -30.9 
 – primary expenditures  -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 -1.4  -1.4 
Revenues 0.7 2.2 2.6 2.7  2.7 
    
Labour income tax increase    
EMU balance  3.3 7.3 12.4 18.5  36.3 
Primary EMU balance  3.4 4.2 3.8 3.7  3.8 
EMU debt 
a -2.0 -69.2 -181.3 -310.7  -678.5 
Government net wealth 
a 5.3 71.1 182.8 312.1  679.8 
Expenditures 1.4 -1.9 -7.1 -13.2  -31.0 
 – interest payments  0.1 -3.1 -8.5 -14.8  -32.5 
 – primary expenditures  1.3 1.2 1.4 1.6  1.5 
Revenues 4.7 5.4 5.3 5.3  5.3 
a Value at the end of the year 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
 
The development of government income in either case can be explained in a similar way to the 
change in primary expenditure. In the long run, government revenues consume a larger share of 
GDP under the labour income tax than under the consumption tax. Again, this says as much 
about the impact of the tax change on GDP as it does about the government’s accounts. The 
implication is that the labour income tax has a more adverse effect on the economy’s output. As 
a result, we witness a relative increase in the public sector’s share of the economy. The overall 
suggestion is that the large tax base makes the consumption tax a more efficient instrument than 
a labour income tax.  
5.  Consequences of a policy postponement 
This section explores whether present generations can be protected by postponing the policies of 
tax smoothing for some time. Here, we account for possible anticipation effects. Given that our 
model features perfect foresight, it would be strange to assume that policy-makers can fool 
households by letting them believe that policies will remain unchanged and then after some time 
renege on these promises. More in line with the idea of perfect foresight is that it is public 
knowledge how long policy-makers will wait before taking policy actions. Rational behaviour 
then makes households act on this information. 
Without economic behaviour, postponement would increase the change in the tax rate that is 
needed to close the sustainability gap. Because of economic behaviour, however, this direct 12 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
effect may be mitigated somewhat. The adverse instantaneous reaction of the tax base to tax rate 
increases strengthens the direct effect, but the anticipation of future tax rates causes a rise in 
private savings, thereby increasing the future tax base. 
A later starting year of tax smoothing results in a larger debt in percentages of GDP at that date. 
Larger debt brings about more debt service, which can only be raised through a decline of the 
primary deficit. Since the primary deficit has to decline through tax increases, this implies the 
later the sustainability policy starts, the larger the necessary tax rate. Table 6 illustrates this for 
each type of tax. 
Table 6. Tax smoothing according to the starting year 
    2006 2026 2046
Consumption tax rate  D  7.7 9.4 11.7
Labour income tax rate  D  11.8 14.9 18.9
Note: D refers to an absolute difference from the baseline projection expressed in percentage points 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
 
As noted earlier, our calculations presume that households know when the tax smoothing policy 
reform will set in. Table 7 reveals that this anticipating behaviour is favourable for the 
government budget. In order to smooth consumption over their life cycles, households diminish 
their consumption in the period before the consumption tax increases (see Figure 2), but do not 
change their labour supply in this period. The boost in private saving increases financial wealth 
in the year that the policy reform takes place. Thus the consumption tax base increases because 
households anticipate the future rise in tax rates. This explains why the tax rate increase can be 
slightly smaller if the policy adjustments are anticipated. 
Table 7. Consumption tax increase with and without anticipation 
   2006 2026 2046
With anticipation  D  7.7 9.4 11.7
Without anticipation  D  7.7 9.7 12.3
Note: D refers to an absolute difference from the baseline projection expressed in percentage points 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
 
Figure 2 presents the development of private consumption according to the starting year of the 
tax increase. For comparison, the effect of tax increases starting in 2006, 2026 and 2046 are 
shown for scenarios in which the policy changes are either pre-announced by the government in 
2006 or are unexpected up until the year of implementation.  
In the two unexpected scenarios, there are sudden and extreme reductions in consumption in the 
years when the policy changes takes place. Since the required tax increase in 2046 is higher than 
that in 2026, the decrease in consumption also greater. When the future policy changes are 
known to individuals, the change in consumption behaviour is more gradual, as households 
accumulate more savings in anticipation of higher taxes in the future. The figure reveals that, 
despite the fact that pre-announcing is favourable relative to an unexpected policy measure, it 
does not fully compensate for the damage of postponing the policy measure. 
 DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 13 
 
Figure 2. Percentage change of consumption according to the starting year of the tax increase, 
consumption taxation 
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Figure 3 presents the labour supply development under various tax change scenarios and 
conveys a similar message as Figure 2. Moreover, it illustrates a characteristic of our model. 
Total wealth has no influence on labour supply since people do not start working harder when 
their wealth declines.
5 Thus there is very little difference in labour supply effects between the 
expected and unexpected policy changes. In the case of an immediate tax increase (in 2006), the 
effect on labour supply is small and remains at a relatively constant level compared with the 
base case scenario. 
Figure 4 presents the absolute change of the primary deficit as a percentage of GDP according 
to the starting year of the consumption tax increase. The figure illustrates an upwards spike in 
the primary deficit in the expected tax-increase scenarios immediately before the policy measure 
becomes effective. This increase is linked to the decrease in labour supply. The year before the 
policy measure, investments decline sharply to make the capital stock consistent with the lower 
labour supply. This leads to a one-time decline in the indirect tax receipts on investments. As a 
consequence, the required decrease in the primary deficit in the first year after the tax change is 
greater in the anticipated scenario than in the unanticipated scenario. In this case, then, an 
unexpected policy change leads to a less volatile economic effect. The decline of the primary 
deficit will be larger as the policy measure is larger.  
                                                                          
5 The marginal utility of consumption is constant in the instantaneous utility function. 14 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
Figure 3. Percentage change of labour supply according to the starting year of the tax increase, 
consumption taxation 
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Figure 4. Absolute change in the primary deficit (% GDP), according to the starting year of the 
tax increase, consumption taxation 
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Figure 5 illustrates the development of the absolute level of the government debt. It can be seen 
that postponing the necessary measure increases the long-run public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Figure 5. Absolute level of government debt (% GDP), according to the starting year of the tax 
increase, consumption taxation 
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In all cases the debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilised in the long run. Yet only the immediate 
consumption tax increase reduces the debt to around zero. Fiscal sustainability requires that at 
any given date, the government’s liabilities must be less than or equal to the present value of its 
future revenues. In each of the delayed tax-increase scenarios, taxes are higher than in the 
immediate tax-increase scenario and therefore so are the discounted future revenues summed 
indefinitely into the future. Thus the level of the government’s debt relative to GDP can be 
higher. The longer the delay in implementation, the higher is the required tax-rate increase, the 
level of government debt and the associated debt service requirements. 
Figure 6 presents the net benefits from the government per cohort, which we interpret as a 
measure of intergenerational redistribution between the private and the public sector. The figure 
shows that the implementation of tax smoothing policies reduces the net benefits that 
households reap from the public sector. The reason is that they face a tax increase that is not 
matched with an increase of government transfers. For older generations, the change in net 
benefits decreases with age. This reflects the fact that older generations are hurt less by higher 
taxes because their remaining working (living) periods are smaller.  
The figure also shows the effect of postponing the implementation of tax smoothing policies 
until 2026 and 2046. Most of the present generations experience smaller net benefit losses. 
Likewise, future generations witness an increase of their net contributions to the public sector. 
Globally speaking, the effects of postponement on the net benefit changes are greatest for the 
generations of working age.  
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Figure 6. Net benefits from the government sector per cohort by year of birth; left panel for 
consumption tax, right panel for labour income tax. 
-25000
-20000
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
1907 1927 1947 1967 1987 2007 2027 2047 2067
2006 Expected 2026 Expected 2046
-14000
-12000
-10000
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
1907 1927 1947 1967 1987 2007 2027 2047 2067
2006 Expected 2026 Expected 2046  
 
6.  Pros and cons of a gradual policy 
Postponement of policy reforms obviously benefits present generations. Unlike our base case 
scenario of an immediate increase of tax rates, the postponement scenarios feature 
discontinuous tax rate profiles. One way to avoid these discontinuities is to pursue a more 
gradual policy of balancing the budget in each year, i.e. keeping the public debt-to-GDP ratio at 
its initial level. Note that these balanced budget policies, like tax smoothing policies, meet the 
requirement of fiscal sustainability.
6 Indeed, policies are fiscally sustainable if they stabilise the 
long-run public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Here we present balanced budget simulations relative to tax smoothing simulations. We assume 
the government wants to stabilise the public debt-to-GDP ratio at its initial level; that is, the 
level in 2006. It is then possible to postpone the necessary tax increase, which means a sharp 
decline relative to the tax smoothing scenario (Figure 7). The tax rate development will then 
follow the dependency ratio, which is the main determinant of the primary deficit development. 
After about 40 years, tax rates become slightly higher than those based on tax smoothing. The 
fast increase of the tax rate in the first few decades slows down in line with the development of 
the dependency ratio. Following 60 years, both balanced-budget tax rates remain at roughly 
constant (higher) levels relative to the tax smoothing rates. The difference is greatest in the case 
of the balanced budget with the labour income tax, again owing to its smaller tax base.   
Since taxes are initially relatively lower, consumption and labour supply are greater than in the 
tax smoothing scenario in the beginning of the simulation period. In the case of labour income 
tax, consumption becomes permanently lower after 50 years, while in the consumption tax case, 
consumption becomes lower after about 35 years. The long-term effects on labour supply of the 
balanced budget policies are less severe, although there is still a decrease relative to the tax 
smoothing case after about 35 years. In the long run, the relative differences stabilise and the 
balanced budget policy using the labour income tax has the most adverse effect on consumption 
and labour supply because of the higher tax burden. 
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Figure 7. Absolute change of the tax rate to obtain a balanced budget, relative to a tax 
smoothing path 
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Figures 8 and 9 show how this tax pattern is reflected in the private consumption and labour 
supply patterns. 
 
Figure 8. Percentage change of private consumption, balanced budgets relative to tax  
  smoothing 
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Figure 9. Percentage change of labour supply, balanced budgets relative to tax smoothing 
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Figure 10 illustrates the net public benefits by cohort from a balanced budget policy relative to 
the tax smoothing case. It can be seen that net benefits develop more positively for living 
generations, particularly those of working age, whereas future generations suffer a deterioration 
of their net benefits. The explanation is that under balanced budget policies, today’s generations 
are not required to share the burden of future fiscal imbalances. Balanced budget policies using 
the labour income tax are the most favourable to present generations (except retirees who are 
indifferent to tax smoothing or balanced budgets) and the most damaging to future generations.  
Figure 10. Net benefits from the government sector per cohort by date of birth, balanced  
    budgets relative to tax smoothing; left panel consumption tax, right panel income tax 
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It is clear from this analysis why balanced budget policies are attractive from a political point of 
view. By taking a gradual approach, present generations are exempted from sharing the burden 
of future fiscal imbalances. Additionally, since today’s working-age cohorts are net contributors 
to government finances (Figure 1), it can be argued that considerations of intergenerational 
equity make a gradual approach the preferred policy option. On the other hand, there are strong 
arguments that tax smoothing policies are optimal from the point of view of economic 
efficiency (see Barro, 1979, Kingston, 1991 and Scott, 1999). DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 19 
 
7.  The influence of demographic shocks on the sustainability problem 
In order to illustrate the effects of demographic variability on the macroeconomic and fiscal 
outcomes of the model, here we simulate three demographic shocks. This will demonstrate both 
the workings of the model and highlight the way in which demographic changes influence debt 
policy decisions. Respectively, we apply permanent shocks in 2006 to the fertility rate, the net 
immigration rate and the mortality rate. All three of the shocks increase the projected population 
in 2026 by 3.45%
7 relative to the baseline but have differing effects on dependency ratios. As a 
result, economic outcomes are influenced in varying ways. In both the baseline and shock 
scenarios, the long run debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilised by a one-time rise in the labour income 
tax rate. 
7.1  Effects of a positive fertility shock 
Table 8 shows the results of a permanent 16% increase in the number of births per each woman 
of childbearing age relative to the baseline population scenario. It can be seen that the shock has 
a significant effect on the size of the total population in the long run, setting it on a course that 
makes it over 27% higher than in the base path by 2100.  
Table 8. Effects of a 16% increase in fertility relative to the baseline scenario with tax  
 smoothing 
  2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
Demography          
Total population (% change)  0.18 2.49 6.49 12.72 27.20 
Old-age dependency ratio (D)  0.00 0.00 -4.20 -10.24 -11.07 
Total dependency ratio (D)  0.00 4.25 3.70 2.01 0.95 
   
Government finance   
Government expenditure (D as a % 
of GDP)  0.08 0.61 0.40 -0.91 -0.99 
Government revenue (D as a % 
  of GDP)  0.27 0.33 0.15 -0.47 -0.49 
Primary deficit (D as a % of GDP)  -0.19 0.28 0.25 -0.44 -0.51 
Government debt (D as a %  
  of GDP)  -0.10 -0.62 13.19 21.40 12.92 
Economic development   
GDP (% change)  -0.22 -0.18 3.31 11.28 25.41 
Labour supply (% change)  -0.17 -0.14 4.61 12.59 27.07 
Capital stock (% change)  -0.17 -0.15 3.74 12.17 26.20 
Private consumption (D as a %  
  of GDP)  -0.15 -0.17 -0.71 -1.76 -1.59 
Balance of trade surplus (D as a % 
  of GDP)  0.66 -0.37 -1.14 0.10 0.69 
   
Labour income tax rate (D)  0.67 
Note: D refers to an absolute difference from the baseline projection, while % points to a relative difference from the 
baseline projection. 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
                                                                          
7 The figure of 3.45% is approximately one standard deviation at 2026 in the stochastic population 
distributions produced by the Programme for Error Propagation (PEP). 20 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
The dependency ratios are also influenced but in opposite ways. The old-age dependency ratio 
is unaffected until 2040, when the new larger cohorts begin to reach working age. From that 
point on, the number of elderly persons to workers is more than 10 percentage points lower. 
This beneficial result of the shock is balanced by a temporary increase in the total dependency 
ratio, owing to permanently larger school-age cohorts. As a result, the sustainability of 
government finances requires a small increase in the labour income tax rate of 0.67%. 
Macroeconomic variables in the simulation are influenced by both the demographic 
developments and the required tax increase. Initially, the increase in fertility has no direct effect 
on labour supply or GDP: only the tax increase slows output slightly. Over time, though, as the 
workforce grows, GDP grows in step with the population change relative to the base. 
7.2  Effects of a positive immigration shock 
Table 9 shows the effects of a 17.5% increase in number of new immigrants entering the 
Netherlands each year. In this scenario, by 2100 the population is projected to be over 15% 
larger than in the base run. Nonetheless, the effects on the dependency ratios are rather modest, 
lowering them slightly over the long term. The sustainable labour income tax rate can only be 
lowered a mere 0.72 percentage points.  
Table 9. Effects of a 17.5% increase in immigration relative to the baseline scenario with tax  
 smoothing 
  2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
Demography   
Total population (% change)  0.12 2.38 6.02 9.90 15.56 
Old-age dependency ratio (D)  0.00 -2.21 -5.24 -3.70 -2.22 
Total dependency ratio (D)  0.00 -0.57 -2.50 -1.52 -1.07 
   
Government finance   
Government expenditure (D as a % 
  of GDP)  -0.10 -0.44 -1.12 -1.03 -0.64 
Government revenue (D as a % 
  of GDP)  -0.26 -0.40 -0.80 -0.66 -0.53 
Primary deficit (D as a % of GDP)  0.15 -0.05 -0.32 -0.38 -0.11 
Government debt (D as a %  
  of GDP)  0.04 1.63 2.50 -2.02 -7.88 
   
Economic development   
GDP (% change)  0.27 2.99 7.47 11.08 16.46 
Labour supply (% change)  0.16 3.10 7.62 11.09 16.41 
Capital stock (% change)  0.31 3.24 7.80 11.32 16.56 
Private consumption (D as a %  
  of GDP)  0.13 -0.09 -0.47 -0.20 0.04 
Balance of trade surplus (D as a %  
  of GDP)  -1.11 -0.55 0.38 0.20 0.00 
   
Labour income tax rate (D)  -0.72 
Note: D refers to an absolute difference from the baseline projection, while % points to a relative difference from the 
baseline projection. 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 21 
 
The slight tax decrease combined with the increase in the labour force from immigration results 
in a positive development of GDP, increasing it to a level over 16% higher than the base run by 
2100.  
7.3  Effects of a negative mortality shock 
Table 10 shows the results of a permanent 32.5% decrease in the mortality rate per age cohort in 
2006. Unlike in the previous two shock simulations, there is no exponential growth in the total 
population, but there is a large increase in the old-age dependency ratio. There is a relative 
increase in the number of elderly persons in the population, while the number of potential 
workers is almost unchanged. As a result, there is a significant impact on government finances. 
The required sustainable labour income tax rate must be 8.3 percentage points higher than in the 
base run as a result of increased age-dependent public expenditure. 
Table 10. Effects of a 32.5% decrease in the mortality rate relative to the baseline scenario with 
tax smoothing 
  2006 2020 2040 2060 2100 
Demography   
Total population (% change)  0.28 3.04 4.57 4.29 4.15 
Old-age dependency ratio (D)  0.00 11.08 14.26 13.98 12.54 
Total dependency ratio (D)  0.00 3.54 6.56 6.18 5.70 
   
Government finance   
Government expenditure (D as a 
  % of GDP)  0.56 2.50 4.85 5.30 4.88 
Government revenue (D as a % 
  of GDP)  3.27 4.24 4.10 4.22 4.31 
Primary deficit (D as a % of  
  GDP)  -2.71 -1.75 0.75 1.08 0.58 
Government debt (D as a % of  
  GDP)  -1.90 -41.10 -61.93 -54.43 -52.76 
   
Economic development   
GDP (% change)  -2.32 -1.58 -2.02 -2.21 -2.12 
Labour supply (% change)  -2.15 -1.25 -1.27 -1.31 -1.21 
Capital stock (% change)  -2.22 -1.22 -1.25 -1.32 -1.21 
Private consumption (D as a % 
  of GDP)  0.05 -1.45 -2.93 -3.42 -3.48 
Balance of trade surplus (D as a  
  % of GDP)  7.38 -0.06 -0.22 -0.21 0.12 
   
Labour income tax rate (D)  8.30 
Note: D refers to an absolute difference from the baseline projection, while % points to a relative difference from the 
baseline projection. 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
Likewise, there is very little beneficial effect on output resulting from the increase in the 
population. The potential labour force is relatively unaffected, while the higher labour income 22 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
tax rate discourages workers and lowers labour supply. The tax distortion produces a decrease in 
GDP of over 2% by 2100 relative to the baseline. 
It can therefore be concluded that the consequences of demographic variability on factors and 
public finances depend not just on the scale of the variability but also the source of the 
variability. Unexpected increases (or decreases) in the population may have either positive or 
negative budgetary effects depending on how they influence the makeup of the population as 
represented by the dependency ratio.   
8. Stochastic  demographics 
In this section we formalise the effects that uncertainty in demographic developments can have 
on economic and fiscal variables, by simulating projections based on population forecasts of the 
Netherlands produced by the Programme for Error Propagation (PEP) developed by Alho & 
Spencer.
8 The programme applies stochastic processes to the forecasted development of fertility, 
immigration and mortality rates. By generating 250 separate stochastic population paths and 
using them to simulate 250 GAMMA simulations, we arrive at a distribution of possible 
macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes that can be given a probabilistic interpretation. It should be 
noted that each of these stochastic GAMMA simulations is itself deterministic: economic agents 
are farsighted and face no uncertainty. Approaching the question of demographic uncertainty in 
this manner offers a great advantage over using deterministic forecasts that simulate the results 
of, for example, worst-case and best-case scenarios in addition to point estimates. That approach 
provides no information on the likelihood of each outcome.
9 
8.1  Probabilistic distribution of demographic developments in the Netherlands 
The most important demographic statistic concerning fiscal policy is the total dependency ratio. 
Since the funding of health care, public pensions and education makes up a substantial 
proportion of government outlays and labour income tax comprises a large share of government 
income, an increase in this ratio is bound to put pressure on fiscal balances. Figure 11 shows the 
stochastic distribution of the total dependency ratio as forecast until 2050. 
The base run line corresponds to the population point forecast that was used in the baseline 
scenario in previous sections. The percentile lines are not single paths of the PEP simulations. 
Rather, they are trend lines connecting cumulative distributions in each forecast year. So at each 
point on the 10
th percentile line, 90% of the dependency ratio forecasts for that year lie above 
the line. The symmetry of the forecasts is evident in that in the base run, the 50
th percentile and 
mean lines are all very close to one another in the figure. 
It can be seen that the dependency ratio is almost certain to rise in the coming decades, but it is 
uncertain by how much. By around 2040 the ratio will level off and possibly decline thereafter. 
It will remain at a relatively consistent level, however, somewhere between 0.85 and 0.95 with a 
60% level of probability. 
 
                                                                          
8 For a technical description of the PEP programme see Alho & Spencer (1997) or the PEP user manual 
(retrieved from http://joyx.joensuu.fi/~ek/pep/userpep.htm). 
9 For a more detailed discussion of the pros and cons of using stochastic simulations, see Bonenkamp et 
al. (2006). DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 23 
 
Figure 11. Stochastic distribution of the total dependency ratio 
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8.2  Probabilistic distribution of the required consumption tax increase 
This interpretation of forecasted demographic developments naturally leads to a probabilistic 
interpretation of the sustainability gap as characterised by the consumption tax increases that are 
required to sustain the budget in each scenario. 
Figure 12 presents the required increases as a frequency distribution. It should be noted that the 
figure omits a number of outlying simulated tax rates that radically diverge from the central 
projection. The average necessary consumption tax increase is 8.5 percentage points from the 
baseline level of 27.4%.  
Figure 12. Stochastic distribution of the consumption tax increases required to make the  
    government budget sustainable 
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Even if the mean required tax rate increase of 8.5% is immediately adopted, the government 
budget will only be sustained with 50% probability.
10 It is obviously questionable whether this 
is adequate. In the next section we apply welfare analysis to demonstrate that a policy of 
budgetary pre-funding can be optimal when there is demographic uncertainty.  
9.  Demographic uncertainty and optimal debt policy 
In this section, to keep the simulation analysis tractable, a number of simplifications have been 
made to the GAMMA model. Among these are: setting rates of inflation and productivity 
growth to zero, eliminating the private pension system, eliminating taxes on profits and assets 
and setting all interest/discount rates equal in addition to a number of technical simplifications. 
We also return to using the labour income tax as the instrument used to sustain government 
finances. Figure 13 shows the frequency distribution of the stochastic required labour income 
tax increases using this simplified version of the model. The mean of the required changes is 
22.7% from the baseline of 31.1%. It should be noted that these estimates are not considered to 
be realistic and are presented only to establish a baseline.  
Figure 13. Stochastic distribution of the labour income tax changes required to make the  
  government budget sustainable with the simplified version of the model 
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9.1  Optimal policy under demographic certainty 
It was remarked in an earlier section that the literature on optimal taxation has the result that tax 
smoothing policies minimise the distortionary effects of taxation and maximise social welfare. 
Here we use the GAMMA model to show that this result does not necessarily hold when the 
effects of an ageing population are taken into account. To measure the impact on overall utility 
of a policy change we construct a social welfare function that aggregates the discounted 
equivalent variations of all living and future cohorts. The equivalent variation is the necessary 
                                                                          
10 Compare with the increase of 7.7 percentage points required in the central path.  DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL POLICY | 25 
 
lump sum monetary transfer that would achieve the same impact on utility as the policy change. 
So a positive aggregated equivalent variation implies a welfare improvement from the 
benchmark case and vice versa.  
Here we use as a benchmark case a tax smoothing policy where the government budget is made 
sustainable by a one-time increase in 2006 of the labour income tax rate. We compare this to 
alternative scenarios where we either increase or decrease the tax rate by a specified number of 
percentage points over the simulation period 2006 to 2026. Then over the remainder of the 
simulation period (until 2206), the tax rate is adjusted to make the government budget 
sustainable. If the initial tax rate is lower (higher) relative to the tax smoothing rate, the future 
tax rate will be higher (lower). Aggregating the equivalent variations will cancel out any 
redistributional effects of the policies and leave us with a pure measure of the distortionary 
effect of the tax rate differences. 
Figure 14 shows the aggregated equivalent variations over a grid of thirteen policy points from 
two different population runs. The first run keeps the 2006 total population and demographic 
composition constant over the duration of the simulation. It can be seen that the curve 
connecting the aggregated equivalent variations reaches a maximum through the central axis, 
implying that tax smoothing is optimal, in accordance with theory. The second population run is 
based on the central projection of the population of the Netherlands produced by the PEP 
programme, which features an ageing population profile. The peak of the curve is situated in the 
neighbourhood of -4 percentage points, indicating that the optimal policy sets the tax rate 4 
percentage points below the tax smoothing rate until 2026 and then increases it thereafter to a 
tax smoothing rate that sustains the budget.  
Figure 14. Aggregate equivalent variations of alternative tax policies under the condition of  
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The explanation for this result is as follows. Labour supply varies by age. According to the data 
with which the GAMMA model is calibrated, as people approach retirement age their labour 
supply becomes more elastic. Table 11 presents the percentage change in labour supply 
resulting from a 1 percentage point increase in the labour income tax rate for three age cohorts. 26 | ARMSTRONG, DRAPER, NIBBELINK & WESTERHOUT 
 
Table 11. Labour supply elasticities with respect to the tax rate by age cohort 
20 year-olds  -0.39 
40 year-olds  -0.06             
60 year-olds  -0.95 
Source: Authors’ simulation results. 
 
Under the current population forecast, the post-war baby boom generation will be reaching the 
ages where labour supply is most elastic, meaning that the aggregate labour supply will be more 
elastic than in the future. Since higher labour supply elasticity implies higher distortions from 
labour income taxation, it is intuitively clear that efficiency would be served by taxing current 
cohorts at a lower rate. Conversely, in the case of a stable population profile, the aggregate 
labour supply elasticity is constant and so the argument for front-loading taxes does not hold. 
9.2  Optimal policy under demographic uncertainty    
Having established the welfare-maximising taxation policy where the future population 
development is known, we now calculate the optimal policy under uncertainty. In this case, the 
best the government can do is to choose the policy that maximises the expected aggregate 
equivalent variations. The procedure for calculation is as follows. A distribution of stochastic 
population projections is produced by the PEP programme.
11 For each projection, the aggregate 
equivalent variation is calculated over the grid of policy points as above. Then the expected 
aggregate equivalent variation for each policy point is calculated by averaging over the 
population projections. The result is the curve denoted ‘expected EVs’ illustrated in Figure 15. 
Figure 15. Aggregate equivalent variations of alternative tax policies under the condition of  
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For comparison, the aggregate equivalent variations curve (denoted ‘central projection’) 
associated with the central population forecast is shown. This can be interpreted as either the 
curve corresponding to the case of certainty or the curve that is faced by a government that 
ignores uncertainty by assuming that the most likely demographic scenario will occur.
12 In 
either case, it can be seen from the figure that taking uncertainty into account implies that the 
optimal tax rate (in the neighbourhood of -3 percentage points from average tax smoothing) in 
the period until 2026 is higher than it would be otherwise (-4% from average tax smoothing). In 
other words, a welfare-maximising government will pursue a precautionary fiscal policy. Since 
individuals are assumed to be risk-averse (from the form of their utility functions), their risk 
aversion is reflected in the social welfare function. 
10. Conclusions 
The paper tackles several questions. In the first part of the paper we compare a variety of 
taxation and debt policy options when the future development of the population is known with 
certainty. The choice of the tax base is investigated and it is confirmed that consumption tax 
smoothing is a more efficient policy than labour income tax smoothing owing to its larger tax 
base. The consequences of postponing a sustainability policy are investigated and it is 
demonstrated that the later the sustainability policy starts the larger the necessary tax rate. In 
addition, the intergenerational distributional effects may be quite large for working-age 
generations. We also compare tax smoothing policies with balanced budget policies. Here, 
similar conclusions apply.  
In the second part of the paper we address the interaction between demographic uncertainty and 
fiscal policy. Simulated demographic shocks show that the required policy responses to 
maintain sustainable debt levels depend not just on the direction and magnitude of the total 
population changes but also on the way in which the shocks affect dependency ratios. Stochastic 
simulations produce a probability distribution of the sustainability gap as characterised by the 
tax rate increase required to keep government finances solvent indefinitely. We also use 
stochastic simulations to demonstrate how a welfare-maximising policy under demographic 
uncertainty implies the optimality of precautionary saving at the public level. 
 
 
                                                                          
12 Note that this is the same projection as the ‘ageing population’ projection in Figure 14. The aggregate 
equivalent variation curve is slightly different, however, because in Figure 15, we use the expected tax 
smoothing rate (averaged from stochastic simulations) as a baseline policy as opposed to the 
(deterministic) tax smoothing rate for the central projection.  
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Appendix A. A Balanced Budget Policy is Sustainable 
Let B denote the level of public debt, r the real interest rate, G the level of public expenditure, C 
the level of private consumption, L labour income and  c
t τ  and  l
t τ  the tax rates on consumption 
and labour income respectively. We have the following version of the accumulation equation for 
public debt (for simplicity, we assume here that the government levies consumption taxes and 
labour income taxes only): 
t
l
t t
c
t t t t t L C G B r B τ τ − − + + = −1 ) 1 (            (A1) 
Forward iteration yields an expression that includes the level of debt at infinity: 
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Fiscal policies are now said to be sustainable if the RHS of equation (A2) equals zero. If not, the 
RHS of equation (A2) is a measure of the size of the sustainability problem. 
The policy simulations all impose the sustainability of fiscal policies, i.e. they manage to bring 
down the RHS of equation (A2) to zero, albeit in different manners. The policies of immediate 
tax smoothing raise some tax rate, either on consumption or labour income, once and for all in 
the first year of the simulation period. The change in the tax rates for the case of consumption 
taxation can be expressed as follows: 
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The expression for the tax rate change in case of labour income taxation is similar. Note that the 
levels of consumption and labour income in general depend on the contemporaneous and future 
levels of all tax rates, reflecting the general equilibrium nature of the model. 
The policies of delayed tax smoothing can be expressed similarly, except for two changes. Time 
zero does not refer to the first year of the simulation period, but to some later future year (10 or 
20 years for example). As a consequence,  o B  refers to the level of public debt at that later future 
year. In general, this is not the level of public debt that applies in the base case scenario at that 
time. Indeed, knowledge of the smoothing policies that will be set at some future date may lead 
economic actors to anticipate this, thereby changing the development of the economy and thus 
the level of the public debt at the time of policy implementation. 
Balanced budget policies imply tax rates that stem from the dynamic accumulation equation (for 
the case of consumption taxation, the case of labour income taxation is similar): 
[ ] t t
l
t t t
cBB
t C L G B r / 0 τ τ − + =            (A4) 
Again, consumption and labour income result from calculations that reflect the balanced budget 
policies and will in general thus depend on the whole time path of these tax rates. 
The tax smoothing policy simulations imply solvency of the public sector by definition. This 
applies to immediate and delayed tax smoothing policies. It can easily be shown that the 
simulations of balanced budget policies impose solvency as well. The reason is that, in case of 
balanced budget policies, the RHS of equation (A2) reduces to the initial level of public debt, 
discounted back an infinitely long period of time. It will be obvious that this equals zero.   
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Appendix B. Robustness of the PEP Results 
This note assesses the robustness of the population model results when combined with PEP by 
comparing the statistics from the output of 250, 500, 1000 and 5000 simulations. The central 
limit theorem states that given a distribution with a mean µ and variance σ
2, the sampling 
distribution of the mean approaches a normal distribution with a mean (µ) and a variance σ
2/N 
as N, and the sample size, increases. Since the true population values of µ and σ
2 are not known, 
it is not possible to assess the true extent of the bias in the moments of the sampling distribution. 
Nevertheless, we would expect that the sample mean converges to the true population mean as 
N increases and the same with sample standard deviation, which is expected to converge to the 
true population standard deviation. In the Gaussian normal distribution the values for the higher 
moments are zero for both for skewness and kurtosis. 
The following details the properties of the sample distributions under a different number of 
draws for a selection of variables: 
Total population 
•  Mean: 18.9 m for N=5000; 18.8 m for others  
•  Median: 18.8 m for N=250; 18.9 m for others 
•  St. dev.: increases with N 
•  Kurtosis and skewness: both approach Gaussian normal with N=5000 
Dependency ratio 
•  Mean: 0.45 for all N 
•  Median: 0.45 for N=5000; 0.46 for others 
•  St. dev.: 0.06 for all N 
•  Kurtosis and skewness: both approach Gaussian normal with N=5000 
Total number of immigrants 
•  Mean and median: 0.007 for all N 
•  Kurtosis and skewness: both increase as N increases 
Total number of emigrants 
•  Mean: 0.004 for N=5000; 0.003 for others 
•  Median: 0.004 for all N 
•  St. dev. : 0.002 for N=5000; 0.006 for others 
•  Kurtosis and skewness: no clear pattern 
Total deaths 
•  Mean and median: 0.01 for all N  
•  St. dev. : 0.001 for N=5000; 0.005 for others 
•  Kurtosis and skewness: approaches Gaussian normal with N=5000; prior to 5000, no clear 
pattern 
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Total number of children  
•  Mean and median: 0.21 for all N  
•  St. dev. : 0.008 for all N 
•  Kurtosis and skewness: no clear pattern for kurtosis; distribution becomes less skewed as 
N increases  
The most commonly used number of simulations currently is 250 owing to the time-consuming 
nature of the estimation process. The above summary of the properties of the sample 
distributions indicates that moments of the distribution only change for N=5000 in most cases. 
While ideally the analysis should be performed on as many simulations as possible, in practice 
5000 projections on the GAMMA model would currently not be reasonable as a result of the 
high time costs. The graphs clearly indicate that the variables that are highly sensitive to the 
number of simulations are the total number of emigrants and total deaths. The relative 
importance of these variables in the overall model has to be taken into account when deciding 
the optimal number of simulations. 
In conclusion, both the graphs and the summary statistics indicate that although the mean and 
median projections are not sensitive to the number of simulations, the differences are 
considerable in the third and the fourth moments and N increases. It would be advisable to 
commence a similar robustness exercise using the overall GAMMA model to assess whether 
250 projections are enough for robust estimation. 
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